Perhaps, persons in bodies are individual subjects, are real, and have physical and psychological properties or predicates {descriptive metaphysics, self}. Selves are subjects of experience that are one mental thing {subject of experience as one mental thing} (SESMET). Experience is a series of mental states {pearl view}. Self is new each time. Introspection shows that consciousness alternates with unconsciousness. There is no personality or agent. Neural processes have mental as well as non-mental properties [Strawson, 1999].
Perhaps, selves are abstract mind-process collections. Perhaps, mind can hold different stories and memories, and these "discourses" create the "I" {discursive psychology}. If brain produces self as narrator {discursive turn}, body can have several selves [Harré and Gillett, 1994].
Perhaps, people build ego identity to oppose loss of self {ego diffusion, self}.
Perhaps, people build ideas of their capabilities and opportunities {ego identity, self} to oppose ego diffusion.
Perhaps, mind has high-level processes {executive level} that know goals and coordinate actions. Self-supervisory processes {self-supervisory level} set goals and their priorities. Using self-supervisory processes makes consciousness. Alternatively, selves are abstract concepts built by mental processes combining functional elements [Mackay, 1987].
Perhaps, selves are concept collections {memeplex, self}, based on first-person language usage [Dawkins, 1976] [Dawkins, 1995].
Perhaps, experiences depend on persons or selves {no-ownership theory} [Strawson, 1999].
Perhaps, all psychological states relate to body {unity relation}. Body and body experiences cause mental states and so create self. Self develops as body develops.
Perhaps, linking declarative memories can produce feelings {autobiographical self}.
Perhaps, object and event perceptions and responses define observer and agent {core-self}, which can use procedural memories but has no unity and is not continuous.
Perhaps, identity and agency are like stories or narratives {narrative self, cognition}. Stories have scenes and characters. Situations or problems arise, develop, and resolve. Stories can guide or suggest action. Goals, wants, and hopes organize narratives, which are self-representations.
People can recall narratives. Perhaps, multiple interconnected and independent narrative fragments are at various editing stages in various mind places.
Narratives assume unified action agents, but narratives are thoughts, not thinkers. Selves are narratives, not entities.
Perhaps, all animal minds have processes that define an overall state {proto-self, cognition} that has no unity, is not continuous, and does not use memory.
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Date Modified: 2022.0225