Perhaps, reality has only one substance: matter, mind, or God {monism}. Mind and brain are the same. However, monism is untrue, because no mechanism can describe purely mental and purely physiological functions [Delbruck, 1986] [Feigl and Scriven, 1958] [Feigl, 1958] [Fischbach, 1992] [Honderich, 1988] [Honderich, 1999] [Ryle, 1949] [Stich, 1991].
Perhaps, reality is neither mind nor matter {neutral monism}. Mental and physical events have different causal laws. Mind and matter differences are only different organizations of same fundamental constituents. Physical, non-physical, or other substance can include both brain and mind. However, matter and brain units do not correspond to mind, consciousness, or sense-quality units.
Perhaps, mental properties and events are not explicable by physical properties and events {anomalous monism}. Mental states are token-identical to physical states.
Perhaps, only mind exists, and matter does not exist {cognitivism}.
Perhaps, internal brain agents {little man} {homunculus} explain psychological properties {homunculus fallacy} [Attneave, 1961] [Rosenblith, 1961].
Perhaps, consciousness is only about sense qualities and concepts {immanentism} and gives no physical-object knowledge.
Perhaps, only mind exists, and matter does not exist {mentalism}.
Naturalistic terms cannot explain consciousness {non-naturalism}.
Perhaps, all physical things have mental or subjective parts, aspects, or properties, typically in different degrees, or are consciousness parts {panpsychism}. It is not clear how such combinations/interactions make high-level consciousness or stay unified. However, all things then have relations between physical and mental inside them. Perhaps, electrons, quarks, and virtual particles have consciousness [Nagel, 1988].
Perhaps, physical objects are "permanent possibilities of sensation" {phenomenalism}. Mental phenomena statements are equivalent to empirical statements or mathematical laws. However, mental-phenomena statements depend on physical environment and perceiver state.
Perhaps, mind has conscious processes and states, which people can study {phenomenology} without necessarily considering body or world [Heidegger, 1996] [Husserl, 1905] [Husserl, 1907] [Husserl, 1913] [Merleau-Ponty, 1945] [Richardson and Velmans, 1997] [Stevens, 1997] [Stevens, 2000]. People can train themselves to try to suspend all judgments and hypotheses while they attend to subjective experiences.
phenomena
Mind cannot know things in themselves but can experience appearances or representations, as sense qualities or thoughts {phenomena, phenomenology}. Phenomena are perspectives on objects. Perspectives hint at object essences. All conscious perspectives, working together, are indirectly object essence.
consciousness
If essences are conscious acts, objects exist. In particular, consciousness becomes itself from all perspectives on all objects. Subject and object of consciousness become the same, because no object is without consciousness, and no subject is without objects and relations. Consciousness is a circular, self-referencing concept: it is a phenomenon and makes phenomena.
Perhaps, only mind exists, and matter does not exist {psychical monism}.
Perhaps, only mind exists, and matter does not exist {spiritualism, mind theory}.
Perhaps, accessing perceptions renders them conscious, people have this ability, and consciousness is real but is not object and is not in space {transcendentalism, mind theory}. Consciousness is an act or process that makes phenomena [Rowlands, 2001].
Perhaps, mind and brain are identical {psychophysical identity} {mind-brain identity theory}. The same property can be both mental and physical. They are like two names for same thing. In the possibility argument, philosophical zombies cannot exist, because they must have the mental state if they have the brain state. However, brain-state and mental-state identity has no plausible mechanism or meaningful connection (McGinn) (Nagel).
language
They only seem different, because different language is for objective and subjective descriptions. Mind and brain can unify by relating both descriptions.
substance
Perhaps, brain and mind share third substance or property, to provide underlying unity. For example, signals entering, or inside, brain can be sense data that can combine into physical objects or into mental objects. Alternatively, physical objects can have mental essences.
existence
People can imagine that no physical world exists, and the physical world is only sense qualities in the mental world. People can imagine that no mental world exists, and the mental world can be disposition to perform certain behaviors in certain circumstances.
mental state
The mental world can be physical mind state, making physical mind.
mental unity
Objects can have minds. Objects can be in one mind.
Perhaps, mental states correspond to neural states {central-state identity}.
Perhaps, mental states are factually identical with brain states but do not have to be logically identical {mind-brain correspondence}.
Perhaps, sense qualities are objective non-relational physical-object properties or are the same as brain electrochemical, biophysical, and relational events {physicalism, mind} [Baker, 1987].
Perhaps, particular mental states, such as pain, are identical to particular brain states, such as nerve firing, but they are not necessarily identical in general {token-identity theory, monism} {token-identity thesis} {token physicalism}. Because mental events can have different neural pathways, they can be instances, not types. Mental events have physical events. Mental states include beliefs and pains.
Perhaps, neural states are state types that only brains can have {type-identity theory, monism} {type-identity thesis} {identity theory} {type physicalism}. Mental states, such as pain in general, and brain states, such as nerve fiber firing, are identical in type but are not necessarily identical in particular instances. Mental variables have physical variables.
Perhaps, mind is only material {materialism}. Materialistic explanations are simple. They have always worked before, are consistent with science, do not have to explain how physical and non-physical interact, fit with evolutionary theory, explain all mental phenomena, explain complex systems, and match all evidence. Consciousness requires only physical explanations.
types
All existing substance is material or physical. Psychological properties are identical to physical-property conjunctions. Psychological properties depend on physical properties but are not material {non-reductive materialism, monism}. There are no phenomena, just ideas, beliefs, or feelings.
Perhaps, mind is interaction among brain processing, body, and environment {action consciousness} {behavior-based robotics} {enactive consciousness} {enactive cognition} {embodied cognition} {radical embodiment} {sensorimotor consciousness} {situated cognition} {situated robotics}. Consciousness depends on action. Simple rules can result in complex behaviors [Clark, 1980] [Clark, 1993] [Clark, 1997] [Varela et al., 1991].
Perhaps, only organisms can be conscious, because consciousness depends on complex biological structures and movements {biological materialism}.
Perhaps, brain locations manifest consciousness by code type or other property {Cartesian materialism} [Dennett, 1991].
Perhaps, mental processes are identical with physical central-nervous-system processes {centralism}.
Perhaps, mental processes are brain states and interact causally with body {central-state materialism}.
If brain states can be physical or physiological properties, other animals can have different sense qualities than people {chauvinism, sensation}, because their structures and physiologies are different.
Perhaps, physical forces act on molecules over time under physical laws and cause thoughts {dynamical systems theory} {dynamical hypothesis}. Dynamics does not involve computation or representation. All events are deterministic and coupled. Systems described by equation systems change over time.
Perhaps, there are no psychological concepts {eliminative materialism}, and intentions and mental states do not correspond to physical brain states.
Perhaps, mental states are both experiences and brain states. For example, temperature is also average random kinetic energy. However, you can measure temperature, in degrees, without measuring average random kinetic energy, in joules. You can use temperature values in many ways separate from their energy values. If mental states are physical states, they can have physical effects without violating physical law. Brain states can be physical or physiological properties. Brain states can be structural properties, like software, caused by something physical and causing something physical {functional materialism}. Machines can simulate human intelligence, so objective language and behavior can be similar. However, machine parts and motions seemingly affect perception, behavior, and consciousness.
Perhaps, external physical world exists, and people perceive it as it truly is {naive realism}.
Perhaps, mental events exist and have effects, but science cannot study effects {naturalism, mind theory}. Naturalistic terms can explain consciousness, but concepts like consciousness, qualia, and subjectivity are unhelpful {eliminativist naturalism}. Naturalistic terms can explain consciousness, and concepts like consciousness, qualia, and subjectivity are helpful {constructive naturalism}. Naturalistic terms can explain consciousness, but people can never find explanation {anticonstructive naturalism} [Dretske, 1988] [Dretske, 1995].
Perhaps, sense qualities correspond to cerebral processes and change brain {network thesis}. Identical sense qualities cannot recur, because brain changes at first sense qualities.
Perhaps, in neuron sets, neurons directly or indirectly interact with all other neurons and themselves. Neuronal groups vary, compete, and undergo selection {neuronal group selection} {neural Darwinism} {somatic evolution} {selectionism, neuron} {theory of neuronal group selection} (TNGS).
neuronal groups
Neuron groups make stimuli into responses and so have input and output. They are functional groups. During development, brain makes various neuron groups by protein regulation, cell division, cell migration, cell connection, myelination, and synapse changes, in response to developmental signals and environment. Brain has many neuron groups for each input-output task {degeneracy, brain}. Neuron groups vary in processing. Neuron groups have regulatory mechanisms and can adapt.
In response to input, brain compares results and prunes neuron groups by making cells die, disconnecting synapses, and reducing synapse strength. Feedback, feedforward, reward, punishment, regulation, and integration make optimum neuronal-group configurations.
selection
Selection strengthens connections that aid survival. Brain uses selection, not logic. During brain development, synapse pruning based on experience reduces overgrowth {developmental selection}. Later, experience strengthens or weakens synapses {experiential selection}.
reentry
Reciprocal neuron connections use signal reentry feedback to coordinate neural events over space and time. Error-correcting control systems are in neuronal groups. Interaction times are typically hundreds of milliseconds. Interactions involve all neurons.
factors
Input-output results depend on body morphology, hormones, emotions, memory, and existing brain structures.
consciousness
A functional group {dynamic core} is for consciousness and is dynamic, unified, private, and complex.
not computers
Brains are not computers, because they receive ambiguous input, have variable structures, have reciprocal connections {reentry}, and have complex output that integrates sense modalities [Edelman, 1989] [Edelman and Tononi, 2000] [Tononi and Edelman, 1998] [Edelman and Mountcastle, 1978] [Edelman, 1987] [Edelman, 1992] [Edelman, 2003] [Edelman, 2004].
Perhaps, conscious and unconscious mental event types have representations in nervous system {neuroscientific realization theory}.
Perhaps, external physical world exists, and people perceive it as it truly is {objectivism}. Alternatively, physical world has properties or events that directly cause experience. For example, surfaces can have properties that always cause red sense qualities.
Perhaps, mind is complex behaviors exhibited in matter structures {peripheralist behaviorism}.
Perhaps, particle positions and momenta completely define physical systems {reductionism, mind theory}. Knowing particle times and energies is equivalent to knowing positions and momenta.
Position and momentum information can predict all future positions and momenta.
questions
Does everything that happens in the physical universe result only from elementary-particle interactions? Are all events and objects determined by current particle and wave positions and momenta, or times and energies? Can higher-level cause affect particle and wave positions and momenta? Can there be something fundamental that is not particles and waves, positions and momenta, times and energies? Do sense qualities have extra information, more than brain anatomical, physiological, psychophysical, and biochemical information?
brain
Under reductionism, brain-particle and environment-object positions and momenta completely define future brain states.
non-physical
Perhaps, physical information can specify non-physical things, properties, or relations. Sentences about non-physical can derive from physical description. Mental processes are explainable by physical brain structures and functions. Facts about people and oneself can use more-elementary terms, without persons or first person. For example, people can be animals with physical and chemical processes.
Pylyshyn [1980] imagined that chips can replace neurons one by one {silicon chip replacement}. Is there any difference in mental events? If not, causal relations determine mentality, and functionalism is correct.
Putnam imagined worlds {twin Earth} in which people and things were identical except that water had different chemical composition. Thought difference depends only on environment. However, different thoughts make twins different.
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Date Modified: 2022.0225